Online Appendix for the article

Work-family conflict and partners' agreement on fertility preferences among dual-earner couples: Does women's employment status matter?

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## Sensitivity Analysis

We ran sensitivity analysis where we replicated the analyses using the complete-case data (i.e., after listwise deletion). The full tables below estimate the effects for the best-fitting model for both full-time dual-earner couples and modernized male breadwinner couples. The coefficients for the individual-level actor and partner effects are almost the same across Table A (based on the complete-case data after listwise deletion) and Table B (based on the analytical sample we use in this study after maximum likelihood estimation).

Table A: Partners' Agreement on Fertility Preferences from the German Family Panel (Pairfam), Complete-Case Data after Listwise Deletion

| Model 1-Full model for the Best-Fitting Model |
| :--- |
| among Full-time Dual-earner Couples |
| b |
| (SE) |

Model 2-Full model for the Best-Fitting Model among Modernized Male Breadwinner Couples
b
(SE)

Individual-level actor effects

## WTFC

FTWC

## Individual-level partner effects

FTWC

## Control Variables

Men's education

Women's education

| Men aged 35-44 | M: 0.036 (0.144) | -0.029 (0.187) |
| :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | F: -0.031 (0.159) | 0.060 (0.162) |
| Men aged 45 and older | M: -0.014(0.209) | 0.076 (0.224) |
|  | F: -0.078 (0.231) | 0.105 (0.194) |
| Women aged 35-44 | M: 0.165 (0.134) | 0.141 (0.167) |
|  | F: 0.077 (0.148) | 0.000(0.145) |
| Women aged 45 and older | M: 0.433* (0.218) | 0.377(0.274) |
|  | F: 0.125 (0.241) | 0.028(0.038) |
| Men's work hours | M: -0.003 (0.008) | $0.017^{+}(0.009)$ |
|  | F: 0.002 (0.009) | 0.005 (0.008) |
| Women's work hours | M: -0.010 (0.008) | 0.009 (0.010) |
|  | F: -0.008 (0.009) | -0.003 (0.009) |
| Married | M: 0.248* (0.121) | 0.012(0.226) |
|  | F: $0.260 *(0.133)$ | 0.317 (0.197) |
| Household income (logged) | M: 0.106 (0.150) | 0.043(0.201) |
|  | F: 0.197 (0.166) | -0.053(0.175) |
| Relationship duration (logged) | M: -0.004 (0.098) | -0.076 (0.173) |
|  | F: -0.019 (0.108) | 0.171 (0.150) |
| Presence of preschool child in the household | M: -0.138(0.131) | -0.066(0.150) |
|  | F: -0.303* (0.145) | -0.018 (0.131) |
| Number of children in the household | M: 0.034 (0.074) | 0.079 (0.095) |
|  | F: 0.089 (0.081) | 0.048 (0.083) |
| Couple lives in East Germany | M: 0.065 (0.110) | 0.000 (0.158) |
|  | F: 0.015 (0.121) | 0.021 (0.137) |


| Chi-square | 4.599 | $7.997^{+}$ |
| :--- | :--- | :---: |
| DF | 6 | 4 |
| CFI | .98 | .99 |
| RMSEA | .02 | .04 |
| R^2 (female partners) | .07 | .16 |
| R^2 (male partners) $^{\mathrm{N}}$ | .09 | .12 |

$\frac{\mathrm{N}}{{ }^{+} \mathrm{p}<.10,{ }^{*} p<.05,{ }^{* *} p<.01,{ }^{* * *} p<.001 \text { (two tailed tests). }}$

Table B: Partners’ Agreement on Fertility Preferences from the German Family Panel (Pairfam), Analytical Sample where Missing Cases are Imputed with Maximum Likelihood Estimation


## Individual-level actor effects

## WTFC

FTWC

## Individual-level partner effects

WTFC
FTWC

Control Variables
Men's education
Women's education

Men aged 35-44

Men aged 45 and older

Women aged 35-44

Women aged 45 and older

Men's work hours

Women's work hours
Married
Household income (logged)

Relationship duration (logged)
Presence of preschool child in the household

Number of children in the household

Couple lives in East Germany
Couple lives in East Germany

Chi-square
DF
CFI
RMSEA
$\mathrm{R}^{\wedge} 2$ (female partners)

M: -0.019 (0.040)
M: -0.176*** (0.053)

| M: | $-0.004(0.050)$ |
| :--- | :--- |
| F: | $-0.156^{*}(0.065)$ |
| M: |  |

F:

| M: 0.149 (0.104) | 0.206 (0.129) |
| :---: | :---: |
| $\text { F: } 0.062(0.115)$ | $0.199^{+}$(0.115) |
| M: -0.078 (0.106) | -0.182 (0.124) |
| F: 0.029 (0.117) | -0.086 (0.110) |
| $\mathrm{M}: 0.045$ (0.140) | 0.115 (0.169) |
| F: -0.016(0.155) | 0.072 (0.149) |
| M:0.016(0.202) | 0.164 (0.208) |
| F: -0.028(0.223) | 0.057 (0.185) |
| M: 0.163(0.133) | 0.058 (0.153) |
| F: 0.077(0.147) | -0.098 (0.135) |
| M: 0.405*(0.207) | 0.269 (0.244) |
| F: $0.135(0.230)$ | -0.056 (0.216) |
| M: -0.005(0.008) | $0.014^{+}(0.008)$ |
| F: 0.000(0.009) | 0.005 (0.008) |
| M: -0.008(0.008) | 0.011 (0.009) |
| F: -0.005(0.009) | -0.005 (0.008) |
| M:0.264* $(0.116)$ | - 0.148 (0.192) |
| F: $0.271^{*}(0.129)$ | $0.291^{+}$(0.171) |
| M: $0.100(0.143)$ | 0.119 (0.180) |
| F: 0.183(0.159) | 0.051(0.160) |
| M: -0.015(0.094) | 0.011 (0.148) |
| F: -0.037(0.104) | 0.335** (0.132) |
| M:-0.123(0.132) | -0.123(0.135) |
| F: $-0.277^{+}(0.146)$ | 0.008 (0.120) |
| M: 0.029(0.071) | 0.050 (0.086) |
| F: 0.082(0.079) | -0.026 (0.076) |
| M: 0.088(0.106) | -0.030 (0.145) |
| F: 0.054(0.117) | 0.042 (0.128) |

$-0.137^{* *}(0.051)$
$-0.113^{+}(0.065)$
$-0.004(0.050)$
$-0.156^{*}(0.065)$
0.206 (0.129)
$0.199^{+}(0.115)$
-0.182 (0.124)
-0.086 (0.110)
0.115 (0.169)
0.072 (0.149)
0.057 (0.185)
-0.098 (0.135)
0.269 (0.244)
-0.056 (0.216)
0.005 (0.008)
0.011 (0.009)

- 0.148 (0.192)
$0.291^{+}(0.171)$
0.119 (0.180)
0.011 (0.148)
$0.335^{* *}$ (0.132)
-0.123(0.135)
0.008 (0.120)
0.050 (0.086)
$-0.026(0.076)$
0.042 (0.128)
$9.082^{+}$
4
.99
. 04
. 02
. 18

| $\mathrm{R}^{\wedge} 2$ (male partners) | .12 | .12 |
| :--- | :--- | :--- |
| N | 442 | 274 |

$\frac{\mathrm{N}}{{ }^{+} \mathrm{p}<.10, * p<.05,{ }^{* *} p<.01,{ }^{* * *} p<.001 \text { (two tailed tests). }}$

